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Public Act 84-1251 creates a peculiar standard of liability for accountants
sued by third parties for negligent misrepresentation. Its wording resurrects
the privity-of-contract defense in a way that raises questions of public policy
and state constitutional law. This commentary will explore these problems
with Public Act 84-1251 and conclude that, one way or another, it should
not be the law in Illinois.
Effective August 6, 1986, Illinois amended its Public Accounting Act' to
protect public accountants in an unprecedented way. Senate Bill 2108,2 now
Public Act 84-1251,3 (the "Act") provides accountants with extraordinary
protection against negligent misrepresentation actions brought by plaintiffs
who are not clients. The amendment initially provides that "no person,
partnership or corporation" licensed to practice public accountancy under
the Act shall be liable for civil damages to persons "not in privity of
contract" unless the conduct of the accountant amounted to intentional
fraud or misrepresentation. 4 This portion of the amendment apparently
precludes any third party actions based on negligence.
However, subsection 2 of the amendment provides that such persons,
partnerships, or corporations are also liable to non-privity plaintiffs if the
public accountant was aware that "a primary intent of the client was for
the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing
the action . . . . -I Given this language, it appears that if a client tells his
accountant that an audit, balance sheet, or other financial document prepared
by the accountant is to be used by the client to obtain a loan from a specific
* A graduate of Harvard Law School, Michael J. Polelle is currently a professor of law
at the John Marshall Law School. He is a native Chicagoan and formerly taught at DePaul
College of Law. Before becoming a professor of law he was a trial lawyer specializing in tort
law. He is the co-author of the treatise Illinois Tort Law.
1. Illinois Public Accounting Act, P.A. 83-291, § 1 (effective Sept. 14, 1983) (codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, paras. 5500.1 to 5536 (1987)). The Illinois Public Accounting Act was
originally chapter 110 1/2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. The Act was transferred to chapter
111 which was established under a program to improve the utility of Illinois statutes. Chapter
111 also includes provisions regulating other professions.
2. S. 2108, 84th Illinois Gen. Assembly (introduced Apr. 11, 1986).
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bank, the public accountant will be liable to the bank for any negligent
misrepresentation made in the document which the bank relies on in extending
the loan. Therefore, this first clause of subsection 2 apparently allows for
third party actions based on negligence, provided the accountant has knowl-
edge of the third party's reliance. This much of the provision, as will be
shown, is neither surprising nor objectionable.
The latter part of subsection 2, however, provides a unique twist. The
second clause contains the following proviso regarding the accountant's
liability toward parties not in contractual privity who sue on the grounds of
negligent misrepresentation, or indeed for any civil action other than inten-
tional fraud:
[I]f such person, partnership or corporation (i) identifies in writing to the
client those persons who are intended to rely on the services, and (ii) sends
a copy of such writing or similar statement to those persons identified in
the writing or statement, then such person, partnership or corporation or
any of its employees, partners, members, officers or shareholders may be
held liable only to such persons intended to so rely, in addition to those
persons in privity of contract with such person, partnership or corporation.6
The effect worked by this proviso is remarkable. While the first part of
subsection 2 provides redress for a third party injured by an accountant's
negligent misrepresentation if the accountant knew the statement would be
used to influence the third party, the second part of subsection 2 conditions
this protection on the accountant notifying the interested parties in writing.
This additional language effectively removes the protection granted in the
earlier portion of the subsection.
For example, let us again assume that a client tells his accountant that
she will use a financial statement prepared by the accountant to obtain a
loan from a specific bank. Let us assume further that the accountant even
acknowledges, orally or in writing, his understanding that a specific bank is
relying on the accuracy of the statement. That accountant cannot be held
liable for whatever harm is caused by the bank's reliance on the negligently
prepared statement provided the misrepresentation does not amount to in-
tentional fraud, or the accountant does not identify the third party in writing
and does not mail a copy of this written identification to both the client
and the bank. The accountant avoids liability even though the client, the
accountant, and the bank know that a third party intends to rely on the
statement, the identity of that third party, and the reason for the third
party's reliance.
Thus, the proviso makes it effectively impossible for any person not in
privity of contract to sue the public accountant for negligent misrepresen-
tation. The proviso mysteriously gives the accountant, and not the client,
the right to prepare the writing which identifies the third parties who will
rely on the statement. It is peculiar that before liability attaches to the
6. Id.
[Vol. 38:685
1989] ACCOUNTANT'S PRIVITY SHIELD 687
accountant, the accountant must notify the client of what the client already
knows-the identity of the third party whom the client intends to influence
with the statement-and must further send a copy of this written identifi-
cation of the third party to the third party. Presumably, the third party, a
bank or lender, for instance, knows not only its own identity but the fact
that it is relying on documents prepared by the accountant. Clearly, the
structure of the proviso produces arbitrary and unfair results.
Even if one wishes to protect accountants from third party liability, the
expectation would normally be that the client, and not the accountant, would
determine the scope of liability. By notifying the accountant that a particular
third party was relying on the accuracy of the financial statement, the client
would provide the accountant with fair warning and the third party with a
degree of protection. Under the present wording of the proviso, however, it
is the accountant who is in absolute control of the scope of his liability.
The accountant obviously has no incentive to prepare a written list of third
parties with whom he is not in privity and to communicate that list to the
client so that these third parties may then sue him or her for negligent
misrepresentation. Even if the public accountant were so heedless of self-
interest in preparing and sending such a written notification to the client,
the accountant is still protected under the amendment so long as he remem-
bers not to mail a copy of this document to the third parties themselves.
This right of the accountant, rather than the client, to determine the scope
of his liability with regard to non-privity third parties is so bizarre and
departs so drastically from Anglo-American legal development7 that only
two conclusions seem plausible. First, the wording of the proviso may simply
be a mistake in drafting caused by legislative pressures. Second, the language
may represent the fine hand of the drafter in uniquely protecting Illinois
accountants from all non-privity third party claims, other than those based
on deceit. But regardless of which explanation is the correct one, the fact
remains that privity of contract has been resurrected, without fanfare, from
its legal grave to protect accountants from tort claims in Illinois.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of Senate Bill 2108 does not reveal the reason for
the wording of the statutory amendment. The original wording of this
amendment to the Illinois Public Accounting Act literally limited the liability
of public accountants for negligent misrepresentation to those with whom
the accountants were in privity of contract.8 Senate Bill 2108 was subsequently
7. See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text (setting forth common law approaches to
accountants' liability for negligent misrepresentation).
8. SENATE JOURNAL OF ILLINOIs at 845 (May 14, 1986).
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amended in the House by Amendment No. 4. House Amendment No. 4
originally provided that a public accountant would be liable "to a third
party who relies on such professional services, and then, only if notice of
the intent to so rely is provided to the person, partnership or corporation,
licensed or authorized to practice under this Act at or before the time the
contract is entered into .... "9 Note that this original version required that
the accountant be provided with, and not provide, the notice that a specific
party would rely on the statement.
However, when Senate Bill 2108 emerged from a joint conference com-
mittee of the House and Senate, formed to achieve a compromise in the
wording of the bill, a curious thing happened. House Amendment No. 4
was reworked into its current version which places the power to defeat the
claim of a relying non-privity party in the hands of the accountant. 0 The
rewording of House Amendment No. 4 effectively destroyed any legal re-
sponsibility public accountants had toward third parties, even where the
accountant actually knows that the third parties are relying on the accuracy
of the accountant's statements. The imposition of limited legal responsibility
was precisely what House Amendment No. 4 sought to accomplish in its
original version." Instead, what emerged from the joint conference committee
was a final version of the bill that in a roundabout way accomplished what
the original version of Senate Bill 2108 sought to achieve: the limitation of
an accountant's responsibility for negligent misrepresentations to those in
privity of contract with the accountant. 2 In effect, the "compromise"
between the House and the Senate resulted in the enactment of the original
view of the Senate sponsors.
Representative Countryman was the only member of the House who,
during debate, noted and objected to the incongruity in the joint conference
committee proposal. The proposal excluded from coverage the very people
the House was trying to protect in its original amendment to the bill-third
parties specifically known by the accountant to be relying on statements
prepared by the accountant.' If such a party relies to his detriment on a
9. HOUSE JOURNAL OF ILLINOIS at 2785 (June 19, 1986).
10. Id. at 4794 (July 1, 1986).
1i. Id. at 2785 (June 19, 1986).
12. S. 2108, 84th Illinois Gen. Assembly (introduced Apr. 11, 1986). The bill as originally
drafted provided:
No certified public accountant, either individually or as a member of a partnership
or an officer of a corporation as provided in Section 8 of this Act, shall be liable,
to persons not in privity of contract with such certified public accountant who rely
on the work product of such certified public accountant, for civil damages resulting
from the certified public accountant's acts, decisions or other conduct in connection
with his duties, except for such acts, decisions or conduct involving wilful or wanton
misconduct.
Id.




negligently prepared statement, he will have no legal recourse except in the
unlikely event an accountant is prepared to expand the scope of his liability
through the written notifications specified by the final version of the bill.'
4
In opposing this final version, Representative Countryman prophetically
noted that its wording "tells us pretty much what the accountants want us
to do and that is to put the thing in the merry-go-round so it becomes so
confusing nobody really knows what's happening, including "the account-
ants."'3
B. Non-Illinois Case Law
To understand the radical change affected by Public Act 84-1251 one must
examine the common law as it now exists across the country. There are
currently four major approaches used by the courts in determining the scope
of an accountant's common law duty for negligent misstatements relied on
by parties not in contractual privity with the accountant.
The most restrictive view of an accountant's liability is that employed by
the state of New York. That approach purports to follow the view of Justice
Cardozo in the classic case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.'
6
Under the New York courts' reinterpretation of Ultramares, an accountant
can be held liable for negligent misrepresentations to noncontractual parties
only if three conditions are met: 1) the accountant must have known that
the financial statement was to be used for a particular purpose or purposes;
2) the accountant must have known that a particular party was intending to
rely on the statement; and, 3) the accountant must have engaged in some
conduct linking the accountant to the known party and which shows the
accountant's understanding of that party's reliance on the accountant's
work.' 7 Thus the original version of House Amendment No. 4 to Senate Bill
2108 was analogous to the New York approach.' 8
The second view, which follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section
552, is somewhat less restrictive.' 9 Under this view, a defendant who in the
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1(2) (1987).
15. ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATE, 84th Illinois Gen. Assembly at 43-44 (July
1, 1986).
16. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
17. Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 551, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118,
493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 443 (1985).
18. The original version of House Amendment No. 4 to Senate Bill 2108 embodies two of
the requirements of Ultramares. The accountant was to be held liable "to a third party who
relies on such professional services, and then, only if notice of the intent to so rely is provided
to the person, partnership or corporation, licensed or authorized to practice under this Act at
or before the time the contract is entered into ...... HousE JOURNAL OF ILLINOIS at 2785
(June 19, 1986). This section required that the accountant know, prior to the preparation of
the statement, that the statement was to be used for a particular purpose and that the accountant
know of the particular party who was to rely on the statement.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Section 552 provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
1989l
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
course of his business, profession, employment, or other pecuniary trans-
action negligently supplies false information for use by others in their business
affairs is subject to liability for the negligent misrepresentation. 20 However,
this duty is owed only to plaintiffs who belong to a limited group of persons
known to the defendant and whom the defendant intends to influence. 2 The
Restatement (Second) approach differs from the New York view because the
defendant does not have to know the specific identity of a particular plaintiff
but only the identity of a limited group who would rely on the information.
A variation of the Restatement (Second) view was recognized by the Illinois
courts before the passage of Public Act 84-1251.22
A third and even more liberal view is that embodied in the "balancing"
approach. Under this view, first created by the California Supreme Court
23
and subsequently adopted in Missouri, 24 the decision whether to create a
duty to non-privity parties for negligent misrepresentation depends on the
weighing of various factors. 25 These factors include the degree to which the
transaction is intended to affect the third party, the foreseeability of harm,
the closeness of the link between defendant's conduct and the harm, the
moral blame accruing to defendant's conduct, and the need to deter future
harm. 2
6
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created,
in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Id.
20. See id. § 552(l).
21. Id. § 552(2)(a)-(b). See also Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322
N.C. 200, 367 S.E.2d 609, 614 (1988) (construing § 552).
22. See infra notes 30-56 and accompanying text for the development of Illinois' common
law approach to accountant liability for negligent misrepresentation and a discussion of its
similarity to the Restatement (Second) approach. See also infra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text for a discussion of how the Restatement (Second) approach has been used to govern other
Illinois professions as well.
23. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
24. Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
25. Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
26. Id.
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Finally, the approach which results in the most expansive scope of duty
simply adopts the standard test for determining the scope of duty in negli-
gence cases. Under this view, the accountant owes a duty to all persons
whom the accountant should reasonably foresee would receive the financial
statements prepared by the accountant and thereafter rely on such state-
ments.-" Wisconsin, New Jersey, and one California appellate case have
adopted this view. 28 This foreseeability test was originally developed by
Justice Cardozo as the standard scope of duty test in negligence cases.
29
C. The Common Law Approach in Illinois
1. State Cases
In 1969, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Rozny v. Marnul,30 recognized for
the first time that a non-privity party could bring an action in Illinois for
negligent misrepresentation." Such parties were no longer limited to actions
for intentional fraud. In Rozny, a surveyor who was working under a contract
to a builder, prepared a plat plan which contained inaccurate descriptions
of the land which was purchased by homeowners. The court held that the
surveyor owed a duty to the ultimate home purchasers for the negligently
prepared plat. The Illinois Supreme Court listed a number of factors which
influenced its decision: the knowledge that a limited group of home pur-
chasers would rely on the plat; the guarantee of accuracy on the plat; the
deterrent effect of holding the surveyor liable; the absence of proof that
corrected copies of the plat were ever delivered; and the undesirability of
allowing an innocent party to bear the burden of the surveyor's mistakes.
32
The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently provided a summary of current
developments regarding intentional, negligent, and innocent misrepresenta-
tion in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.33 The Moorman court
cited Rozny and stated that one who is in the business of supplying infor-
27. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (1986) (duty of care owed to reasonably foreseeable plaintiff
who relies on negligently prepared financial statement); Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352,
461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (when individual auditor furnishes opinion with no limitation in
certification as to whom statements may be disseminated, duty arises as to those parties who
could be reasonably foreseen as recipients); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113
Wis. 2d 376, 386, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983) (accountant's liability to third parties determined
under acceptable principles of negligence law).
28. See supra note 27 (citing cases).
29. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (liability for negligent
act will lie where possibility that the act would cause resulting harm was in range of "reasonable
apprehension").
30. 43 I11. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
31. Id. at 68, 250 N.E.2d at 663 ("tort liability will henceforth be measured by the scope
of the duty owed rather than the artificial concepts of privity").
32. Id. at 67-68, 250 N.E.2d at 663.
33. 91 11. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
mation to guide others in their business transactions may be held liable for
negligent misrepresentations.1
4
It is the Illinois Appellate Court, however, that has been left to apply the
principles articulated in Rozny and Moorman to accountants. In Brumley v.
Touche, Ross & Co. (Brumley I)," the appellate court, after surveying the
law in other jurisdictions, concluded that a public accountant had a duty to
third persons who relied on a document which was negligently prepared by
the accountant, provided the accountant was acting at the direction of his
client, or on behalf of his client, to benefit or influence the third party with
the document.3 6 In applying this test, the appellate court in Brumley I
affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint because the plaintiff in-
vestor had only alleged that the public accounting firm should have foreseen
reliance on the audit by a class of investors interested in purchasing the
client's business. 37 The complaint failed to specifically allege that the public
accounting firm knew of the plaintiff or that the audit was to be primarily
used by the accounting firm's client to influence the plaintiff investor."8
However, in Brumley 11,39 the same court found that the plaintiff investor
had made the proper allegations in the third amended complaint. 40 The
Brumley II court noted the key allegations sufficient to state a cause of
negligent misrepresentation against the accountant:
Plaintiff also alleged that he advised Touche, Ross [defendant] of his
interest in acquiring KPK stock and that the reports prepared by defendant
had been submitted to plaintiff for the purpose of influencing his stock
purchase decision. The complaint further alleged Touche, Ross knew he
was using the reports to formulate an offer for the stock and that defendant
confirmed to plaintiff that its auditing report accurately reflected the
financial position of its client KPK.
4
1
It was also made clear in both Brumley I and Brumley II that the Illinois
Appellate Court intended to use the very same test for accountants that the
Illinois Supreme Court had developed for defendant lawyers who are sued
by those not in privity of contract with them.
4 2
34. Id. at 88-89, 435 N.E.2d at 452 ("economic loss is recoverable ... where one who is
in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions
makes negligent representations.").
35. Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 123 Il. App. 3d 636, 463 N.E.2d 195 (1984) (Brumley
I).
36. Id. at 642, 463 N.E.2d at 200.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 831, 487 N.E.2d 641 (1985) (Brumley
I/).
40. Id. at 836, 487 N.E.2d at 645.
41. Id.
42. Brumley 1, 123 Il1. App. 3d 636, 642, 463 N.E.2d 195, 200 (1984); Brumley II, 139 Ill.
App. 3d 831, 835, 487 N.E.2d 641, 644 (1985) (citing Brumley I as having sought to pattern
duty of accountant after duty imposed upon attorney with regard to non-privity suits based on
negligence).
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2. Federal Decisions
Illinois federal district courts have shed further light on the Illinois common
law approach by applying Brumley I and Brumley II to new situations. In
Gutfreund v. Christoph,43 for example, seventeen investors sued an account-
ing firm for violating federal statutory law and brought a pendent claim of
negligent misrepresentation under Illinois law. The plaintiffs alleged that the
accountants misrepresented the economic viability of a dairy farm. n" Al-
though the investors were not in privity with the defendant accounting firm,
the federal district court found that unlike the situation in Brumley I, the
public accounting firm in Gutfreund made its economic projections at the
behest of its clients to influence prospective dairy farm investors. 45 Such
projections were made primarily, if not exclusively, for the purpose of
influencing those investors. 46 The Gutfreund court reasoned:
This is not at all like a garden-variety annual certification of financial
statements to a company's Board of Directors, which then chooses to use
those statements to promote a scheme of its own. On the contrary, [the
accounting firm's] development of the projections for the farm had as its
present goal the inducement of investors to buy partnership interest in Fox
Briar. Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claims survive.47
Similar to Gutfreund, Frymire v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 48 also
involved a pendent state claim for negligent misrepresentation that was
governed by Illinois law. Unlike Gutfreund, however, the federal district
judge in Frymire concluded that although the defendant accounting firm had
expressly allowed its client to use financial statements prepared by the firm
in the client's annual reports, the accounting firm owed no duty to investor
plaintiffs who had relied on such statements. 49 The court reasoned that the
complaint did not allege that the client company specifically directed the
accounting firm to prepare a financial statement for the express purpose of
luring investors. 0
The Frymire court then went even further in justifying its conclusion. The
court distinguished Brumley II by noting that only one major investor was
seeking control of a company in that case," whereas the case before the
court involved a class of unspecified investors and, therefore, did not satisfy
the limitation announced by the Illinois Supreme Court in Rozny v. Marnul.52
In Rozny, the Illinois Supreme Court had stated that the fact that the class
43. 658 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
44. Id. at 1380-81.
45. Id. at 1394.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1394-95.
48. 657 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
49. Id. at 897.
50. Id. at 898-99.
51. Id.
52. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 66-67, 250 N.E.2d 656, 662-63 (1969).
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of potential plaintiffs was "restricted to a comparatively small group" was
relevant to the determination.13 Accordingly, the Frymire court concluded:
"While Illinois law will impose a duty on auditors which extends beyond
their immediate client in some situations, the scope of that duty is not broad
and it does not extend to investors in general as plaintiffs allege."
'5 4
In short, the federal district court applications of Brumley I and Brumley
1H, as limited by the broader guidelines set by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Rozny and Moorman, indicate that Illinois common law approach to ac-
countant liability is quite similar to the approach taken by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, section 552. The Brumley courts' requirement that the
accountant have knowledge of the third party's reliance on the document is
explicit in the Restatement (Second). The Rozny court approvingly cited the
tentative draft of section 552, requiring that the group relying on the
statement be limited rather than general in nature and number.55 The Moor-
man court's focus on plaintiffs who are engaged in the business of supplying




A. The Lack of a Rational Justification for Public Act 84-1251
A survey of common law development outside Illinois demonstrates that
as a result of the Illinois privity-shield amendment for public accountants,
Illinois is not only out of the mainstream of legal development, but out of
the stream itself. None of the four major common law approaches reviewed
in the previous section even hints at the virtual veto over liability which,
under the Illinois amendment, is given to the very group who is to be
regulated. The new legislation, perhaps unwittingly, perhaps not, would even
make it impossible to enforce the rights of a third party beneficiary who
was specifically intended to benefit from the contract between client and
accountant.5 7 Even in this situation, if the accountant chose not to comply
with the written identification requirements of Public Act 84-1251, liability
would not be imposed.
In contrast, the Kansas legislature recently enacted a statute which holds
53. Id. at 67, 250 N.E.2d at 663.
54. Frymire, 657 F. Supp. at 899.
55. 43 I11. 2d at 66-67, 250 N.E.2d at 662-63.
56. See supra note 19 (Restatement (Second) requires that supplier of information be engaged
in a course of business or some transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest).
57. For a discussion of the difference between parties to a contract in "privity" and third
party beneficiaries, see Wilde v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 134 Ill. App. 3d 722, 731, 480
N.E.2d 1236, 1242 (1985) (one in privity is actual party to contract whereas third party
beneficiary is one whom contract is intended to benefit although not actual party (citing Sabath
v. Mansfield, 60 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1016, 377 N.E.2d 161, 168-69 (1978)).
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an accountant liable if:
(1) the defendant knew at the time of the engagement or the defendant
and the client mutually agreed after the time of the engagement that the
professional accounting services rendered to the client would be made
available to the plaintiff, who was identified in writing to the defendant;
and (2) the defendant knew that the plaintiff intended to rely upon the
professional services rendered the client in connection with specified trans-
actions described in writing."'
Although Kansas also requires a written notification of third party identity,
it is the client who notifies the accountant of that identity and not the other
way around as in the Illinois legislation.
In fact, not even the model bill prepared by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants gives control over the scope of liability to the
accountant.5 9 Rather, like the Kansas statute, this model bill turns on whether
the plaintiff third party was specifically identified to the defendant account-
ant.6 0 The model bill does not even require that the accountant be notified
in writing.6 1 It is paradoxical that Illinois provides public accountants with
greater protection than that recommended in a model bill designed by a
national association of accountants.
58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1987).
59. A STATUTE FOR A PRVTY REQUIREMENT IN SUITS FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF
ACCOUNTING SERVICES (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1986). The text of the statute
reads as follows:
I. Applicability of Chapter-Suits for Negligent Performance of Accounting Serv-
ices
(a) This chapter applies to all causes of action of the type specified herein filed
on or after the effective date.
(b) This chapter governs any action based on negligence brought against any
accountant or firm of accountants registered, licensed or practicing in this state by
any person or entity claiming to have been injured as a result of financial statements
or other information examined, compiled, reviewed, certified, audited or otherwise
reported or opined on by the defendant accountant.
II. Requirement of Privity
No action covered by this chapter may be brought in any court in this state
unless:
(a) The plaintiff (1) is the issuer (or successor of the issuer) of the financial
statements or other information examined, compiled, reviewed, certified, audited
or otherwise reported or opined on by the defendant accountant and (2) engaged
the defendant accountant to examine, compile, review, certify, audit or otherwise
report or render an opinion on such financial statements; or
(b) The defendant accountant: (1) was aware at the time the engagement was
undertaken that the financial statements were to be made available for use in
connection with a specified transaction by the plaintiff who was specifically identified
to the defendant accountant, (2) was aware that the plaintiff intended to rely upon
such financial statements in connection with such specified transaction, and (3) had
direct contact and communication with the plaintiff and expressed by words or
conduct the defendant accountant's understanding of the plaintiff's reliance on such
financial statements or other information.
60. See supra note 59.
61. Id.
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In addition, the Illinois amendment departs from the trends in Illinois
common law regarding actions for negligent misrepresentation to third parties
not in privity. Illinois courts have applied a version of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to impose this kind of liability for every professional
group engaged in the enterprise of supplying information for the guidance
of others. 62 Nonetheless, the Illinois General Assembly in Public Act 84-1251
exempted only public accountants from this orderly growth of common law
liability. Surveyors remain liable for negligent misrepresentations to third
parties even if they do not prepare and mail a list of such parties. 63 Similarly,
lawyers and termite inspectors are subject to the same liability. 64 The dis-
criminatory nature of the amendment is apparent in the fact that it provides
unique protection for the accounting profession. Although every Illinois case
which has considered the problem has determined that, in principle, the same
law that applies to lawyers should apply to accountants.
There is no adequate justification for this special back-to-privity protection
for accountants. First, at the time of the Ultramares5 decision by Justice
Cardozo, the accounting profession was arguably a fledgling profession
needing judicial protection due to the lack of malpractice insurance protec-
tion. Now, however, malpractice insurance appears to be available at rea-
sonable costs in relation to professional income and none of the cases
indicates any kind of malpractice insurance crisis comparable to that alleged
to exist in the medical profession." Economic justifications, therefore, are
inadequate.
Second, there is no lack of a fair legal standard by which to determine
whether an accountant has acted negligently. Public accounting firms have
developed the generally accepted principles of accounting that provide judges
with adequate standards by which to determine negligence.
Third, accountants are often the best cost-avoiders because they are better
able to pass on the cost of the harm to society than is the client.6 7 The client
is often bankrupt or judgment-proof. The client's insolvency is usually why
the accountant is sued in the first place. Furthermore, even if the client is
solvent, individual investors and small businesses are not as capable of
absorbing the loss or passing it on in the form of higher prices as are the
increasingly larger and more complex public accounting firms.
62. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
63. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
64. Ogle v. Fuiten, 102 Ill. 2d 356, 466 N.E.2d 224 (1984) (lawyer); Perschall v. Raney,
137 Ill. App. 3d 978, 484 N.E.2d 1286 (1987) (termite inspector).
65. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
66. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 349 & n.ll, 461 A.2d 138, 151 & n.l1 (1983) (citing
1976 survey by the Practicing Law Institute which found that accounting firms had little
difficulty in obtaining insurance at reasonable cost).
67. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (1986) ("risk of such loss is more appropriately placed on




Fourth, the courts have suggested that, even without malpractice insurance
coverage, accountants can protect themselves from liability and at the same
time give fair warning to third parties by expressly disclaiming in their
accounting statements any intent that third parties should rely on the state-
ments.6 The accountant's failure to make this disclaimer reflects a desire to
reap the good will and confidence of an unsuspecting third party while
assuming no risk. It is legally perverse to hold that an unrestricted guarantee
of accuracy on a survey is a factor that can be used to impose third party
liability on a surveyor but that same unrestricted statement cannot be used
to impose liability on an accountant. If the certification proves inaccurate,
the accountant reaps the benefit of the unrestricted certification without
fully bearing the cost.
Finally, in what was a doctrinally questionable distinction to begin with,
Public Act 84-1251 widens the disparity in legal treatment between the scope
of duty applied where a product is at issue and the scope of duty applied
in cases involving defective information. The basic justification for this
disparity is the fear of the development of unlimited liability to an unlimited
group for an unlimited time where information is involved. 69 However, this
concern applies with equal force to product liability. Additionally, this
concern can, to the extent it remains valid, be addressed by appropriate
statutes of limitation or repose. Notwithstanding, the law continues to insist
that information flow deserves more protection than product flow.70
But, even if one assigns a greater social utility to negligent information
than to a negligent product, the distinction is basically artificial. This is so
because underneath every negligent misrepresentation a diligent lawyer can
usually find a negligent act or omission. If a standard negligence analysis,
incorporating the foreseeability factor, were applied to the same factual
scenario, the actor would often be subject to liability anyway. For example,
in the classic case of Glanzer v. Shepard7 a public weigher was held liable
for negligently misrepresenting the weight of beans purchased by a plaintiff
who was not in privity with the public weigher. The foundation for that
negligent misrepresentation was probably a negligent act in the physical
weighing of the beans. That negligent act was no different than the careless
68. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152 ("auditors could in some circumstances
... expressly limit in their certificates the persons or class of persons who would be entitled
to rely on the audit"). See generally Stanton & Dugdale, Recent Developments in Professional
Negligence-II.: Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, 132 NEw L.J. 4, 5 (1982) (discussing
English court's view of disclaimers in accountant's statements).
69. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444 ("[i]f liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class").
70. Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1987) (many producers of
information have difficulty reaping financial benefit from society because property rights system
with regard to information is incomplete; law must be careful not to impose too heavy a burden
on producers or underproduction of information or ideas will result).
71. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (opinion by Cardozo, J.).
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driving of a car. Yet Illinois Public Act 84-1251 even forecloses this last-
resort avenue of liability because the act immunizes the accountant not only
for misrepresentations but also for the "acts, omissions, decisions or other
conduct ' 72 that were the cause of the misrepresentation.
B. A Possible Constitutional Problem With Public Act 84-1251
The lack of wisdom in passing Public Act 84-1251 may have even broader
ramifications than simply providing a good reason for repeal of the law. A
strong case can be made that this legislation violates article IV, section 13
of the Illinois Constitution.73 Section 13 prohibits the General Assembly
from passing a special law whenever a general law is or can be made
applicable, according to judicial determination. 74 The Illinois Supreme Court
has observed that laws which confer a special or exclusive benefit on a group
without a sound rational basis for doing so are particularly vulnerable to
attack under this provision."s
In several cases, the Illinois Supreme Court has specifically applied this
constitutional principle to laws benefitting one profession or occupation over
another. 76 Two cases are particularly relevant to the constitutionality of
72. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1(1) (1987).
73. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. For a discussion assessing the validity of Public Act 84-1251
under the "Right to a Remedy and Justice" clause, art. I, § 12, of the Illinois Constitution,
see Henry, Limiting Accountants' Liability to Third Parties: A Review, 77 ILL. B.J. 322, 326
(1989). Professor Henry, however, concludes that the argument for unconstitutionality under
art. I, § 12 is weak. Id.
74. The text reads as follows: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law
when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." ILL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 13. See also
Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 111. 146, 103 N.E.2d 617 (1952) (purpose of constitutional section
prohibiting special laws was to prevent granting of privileges to one or more persons while
impairing rights of others). See generally Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois,
25 DEPAuL L. REv. 385 (1976) (discussing history of art. IV, § 13 and comparing the analysis
under it with analyses under federal and Illinois equal protection clauses).
75. See, e.g., Illinois Polygraph Soc'y v. Pellicano, 83 I11. 2d 130, 137-38, 414 N.E.2d 458,
462 (1980) (upholding legislation providing for the licensing of lie-detector operators). The
Pellicano court defined the test under § 13 as follows: "Special legislation confers a special
benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others
similarly situated. It arbitrarily, and without a sound, reasonable basis, discriminates in favor
of a select group." Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court has also noted that the language in art. IV, § 13, explicitly
giving the judiciary power to enforce the provision, "has increased judicial responsibility for
determining whether a general law 'is or can be made applicable."' See, e.g., Grace v. Howlett,
51 111. 2d 478, 487, 283 N.E.2d 474, 479 (1972) (striking down under art. IV, § 13 provisions
of no-fault automobile insurance statute, which placed statutory cap on damages recoverable
in any auto accidents resulting in less than death, but only extended mandatory minimum
insurance requirement to policies protecting "private passenger automobiles").
76. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wu, 102 rll. 2d 468, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984) (upholding exemption
in statute-which ordinarily made any medical information obtained by board strictly confi-
dential-solely for physicians whose staff privileges are being challenged); Anderson v. Wagner,
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Public Act 84-1251. In Skinner v. Anderson,77 the state high court struck
down as violative of article IV, section 13 a legislative attempt to create a
special four-year statute of limitations applicable only to architects and
contractors. 7 The Skinner court found determinative the lack of reasonable
justification for granting architects and contractors a legal benefit not con-
ferred on others whose negligence in the construction or improvement of a
building could also lead to liability.79 In Wright v. DuPage Hosp. Ass'n,s0
the same court struck down a statute attempting to limit to $500,000 the
maximum amount of damages which a malpractice plaintiff could recover
against a physician or hospital."s Distinguishing the statute from the workers'
compensation area, which also limits liability, the supreme court concluded
that society derived no quid pro quo from the special favor given to
physicians and hospitals.8 2 Thus, it is not the classification itself which
79 I11. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (upholding absolute four-year statute of limitations period
applicable only to medical malpractice actions); Wright v. DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I11. 2d 313,
347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (striking down maximum liability provision applicable solely to medical
malpractice actions); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (striking down
absolute four-year statute of limitations period applicable only to architects and contractors).
77. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
78. Id. at 459-61, 231 N.E.2d at 590-91.
79. Id. at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591. The Skinner court reasoned:
If, for example, four years after a building is completed a cornice should fall
because the adhesive used was defective, the manufacturer of the adhesive is granted
no immunity. And so it is with all others who furnish materials used in constructing
the improvement. But if the cornice fell because of defective design or construction
for which an architect or contractor was responsible, immunity is granted. It can
not be said that the one event is more likely than the other to occur within four
years after construction is completed.
Id.
80. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
81. Id. at 325-30, 347 N.E.2d at 741-43.
82. Id. at 327-28, 347 N.E.2d at 742. The court noted that under the Workers' Compensation
Act, "the employer assumed a new liability without fault but was relieved of the prospect of
large damage judgments, while the employee, whose monetary recovery was limited, was awarded
compensation without regard to the employer's negligence." Id. at 327, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
The Wright court further observed that workers' compensation law "provides for the payment
of the employee's medical expenses and payment of compensation for the duration of his
incapacity, which may exist throughout his life." Id.
The Wright court, however, found no such trade-off with the medical malpractice statute.
The court pointed out that the malpractice statute, while granting a great privilege to the
medical profession, "abolished no common law defenses, nor did it purport either to alter the
essential elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice or lessen the plaintiff's burden
of proof." Id. Further, in contrast to the guaranteed payments under workers' compensation,
the malpractice statute lessened the plaintiff's recovery without any provision for the future of
a "very seriously injured malpractice victim .... " Id. at 327-28, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
Also relevant for purposes of analyzing the constitutionality of Public Act 84-1251, the
Wright court drew a distinction between statutory limitations on purely statutory rights and
statutory limitations on rights which existed at common law. While 'the constitutional question
is not formidable' in the former, it can be in the latter if there is no reasonable justification
for the statute. Id. at 326, 347 N.E.2d at 742 (quoting Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 29, 147
N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958)).
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violates article IV, section 13, but the lack of a reasonable justification for
singling out one particular group as deserving of a privilege that is denied
to other, similar groups.
Applying these principles to Public Act 84-1251, it is evident that the lack
of any reasonable justification for awarding accountants such a potent privity
shield against tort liability provides potent ammunition for a constitutional
attack under article IV, section 13. As demonstrated in the previous section
of this Article, accountants have no more need for liability protection than
do any other classes of Illinois professionals. To recall one specific example:
any peculiar need that accountants had for special liability protection when
they were members of a fledgling profession has long since vanished.83
Further, as in Skinner and Wright, society scarcely benefits by allowing
accountants to unilaterally control their negligence liability toward innocent
third parties. Indeed, these innocent third parties often have no recourse
against the fraudulent or mismanaged client who often is either insolvent or
otherwise judgment-proof. This same lack of a quid pro quo proved fatal
to the medical malpractice statute at issue in Wright.
It is of course true that, in Anderson v. Wagner,8 4 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld legislation which had created a special statute of limitations
for physicians and hospitals in malpractice actions. 5 Anderson, however, is
simply an example of a special benefit conferred by legislation that was
reasonably justified by the circumstances. The Anderson court found the
legislature's articulated belief that a medical malpractice crisis existed was
reasonable.8 6 Going beyond the legislature's stated beliefs, the court noted
that much empirical data had shown the existence of this medical malpractice
crisis and the increasing difficulty medical providers had in trying to obtain
medical malpractice insurance at reasonable rates." This crisis, moreover,
was limited to medical malpractice, thereby justifying the conferral of the
special limitations period to medicine but not to other fields. s8
This crisis justification, however, is absent with respect to Public Act 84-
1251. To again draw on a previous section of this Article, the empirical
evidence does not suggest any accountancy crisis due to the unavailability
of accountant malpractice insurance. 9 Moreover, even if accountant mal-
practice insurance rates were unreasonably high, for example, there is nothing
83. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fledgling profession
view as articulated in 1931.
84. 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979).
85. Id. at 312-21, 402 N.E.2d at 568-72.
86. Id. at 316, 402 N.E.2d at 570. The Anderson court also relied heavily on the fact that
many other states had limited medical malpractice liability in response to the crisis and all these
statutes had been "uniformly upheld." Id. Public Act 84-1251, in contrast, is unique to American
law.
87. Id. at 301-02, 402 N.E.2d at 562-63.
88. Id. at 316, 402 N.E.2d at 570.
89. See supra note 66.
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to suggest that other professions do not share the problem in equal measure. 9°
In short, the General Assembly's failure to rationally differentiate ac-
countants from other professionals who are equally concerned with mal-
practice liability raises the likelihood that Public Act 84-1251 will be struck
down as a violation of article IV, section 13. But, regardless of whether
Public Act 84-1251 is struck down by the Illinois courts as unconstitutional
or is repealed by the General Assembly as a bad idea, the statute should not
be part of the laws of Illinois. Allowing the statute to remain on the books
increases the risk that more and more special interest legislation will develop
for even more professions and occupations.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, Public Act 84-1251 is an aberration in the law of professional
responsibility. It creates a special and unjustified status for Illinois public
accountants by protecting them from a class of lawsuits with which every
other profession must contend. It is likely that Public Act 84-1251 will
someday be attacked as special legislation in violation of the Illinois Con-
stitution and, given the lack of any reasonable justification for granting
accountants the boon they obtain under the law, a strong case can be made
for deeming this statute unconstitutional under Illinois law.
90. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People ex rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata &
Kassabaum, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 252, 500 N.E.2d 34 (1986) is also distinguishable. In Hellmuth,
the supreme court was faced with the General Assembly's second attempt to draft a statute of
limitations for architects and contractors; the first attempt had been struck down in Skinner v.
Anderson, 39 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967). See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Skinner. The second version, however, was different in several respects.
First, instead of an absolute four-year limitations period as in Skinner, the new version provided
that a plaintiff bring suit within two years of the time he or she knew or should have known
of the act or omission. Hellmuth, 114 I1. 2d at 260, 500 N.E.2d at 37. Although the statute
provided an absolute limitations period of 12 years from the date of the act or omission, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. I 10, para. 13.214(b) (1987), the constitutionality of this portion of the statute
was not before the court. Id. But cf. Blackwood v. Rusk, 148 III. App. 3d 868, 500 N.E.2d
69 (3d Dist. 1986) (upholding 12-year statute-of-repose portion of the statute as reasonably
related to the statute's stated purpose of circumscribing potentially unlimited tort liability of
those who design and construct buildings). Second, the new version did not distinguish between
architects and architect-owners as the previous statute had. Id.
The Hellmuth court upheld the statute as a reasonable classification by the General Assembly.
The court first noted that the statute does not classify on the basis of status but rather on the
activities performed, i.e., all who design or construct buildings derive its benefit. Id. at 261-
62, 500 N.E.2d at 37-38. But the important factor for the Helimuth court was the fact that
the statute of limitations at bar-or at least as much of the statute as was before the court-
was a traditional-type limitations period. The court reasoned: "The legislature has traditionally
enacted statutes of limitations which vary as to the activity and the cause of action involved."
Id. at 263, 500 N.E.2d at 38.
As noted above, however, Public Act 84-1251 Is anything but a traditional limitation on
liability. The rationale of Hellmuth, therefore, seems inapposite in assessing its constitutionality.
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